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Banking on change? We need strong political action to break
the financial industry’s stranglehold on politics and promote
the common good
Andrew Bowman, Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, John law, Adam Leaver, Michael
Moran and Karel Williams have recently published a report for the CRESC on the British banking industry
and the Libor scandal. In this article, they call for a more comprehensive investigation than the one
announced by the Prime Minister on Monday, and argue that the banking crisis is a crisis of politics.  
As the story of  the Libor f ixing scandal turns into a story of  corrupt individuals, it obscures the key
question of  what are banks f or and how we want them to serve the national interest. Much of  what has
been revealed, we already know. We have a structurally rotten system of  interconnected power elites
which does litt le to serve the national interest.
But what exactly has gone wrong and what should be done? To answer these questions, the state has
used the standard Brit ish response of  a limited investigation and in t ime, the punishment of  a f ew
individuals. The latest working paper f rom CRESC ‘Scapegoats aren’t enough: a Leveson f or the Banks?’
takes on these issues. Its starting point is that punishing scapegoats to change the culture of  f inance is
not enough because it ignores the role of  bank business models in shaping this culture, it obscures the
co-option of  the polit ical system with the f inancial elites and totally ignores questions about banking’s
role in society.This ‘it ’s-a-f ew-rotten-apples’ alibi conceals the reality that the ‘culture of  f inance’ can
only be addressed through structural and organisational ref orms. The current response of  the coalit ion
government is to close of f  any inquiry of  broader issues, such as the relationships between polit ics and
f inance, the role of  f inance in society and banking business models. In practice, what this means is that
‘radical’ solutions become a witchunt where a f ew f igureheads are paraded while the f inancial structure
remains untouched.
Since the f inancial crisis in 2007, Brit ish investigations such as the Bischof f  report have been a case of
‘f inance reporting on f inance’ with limited remits and promoting, at best, modest ref orms. The well-
f unded f inance lobby has worked hard to limit more serious action and ensured, as CRESC has long
argued, the paradox of  big crisis/small ref orm. The Libor episode embodies a sense of  invulnerability to
the normal restraints which govern the rest of  us and is rooted in the ‘light touch’ regulation. This of
course depended on a polit ically created space f or a privileged group that governed itself  and in turn
provided substantial f unding to governing polit ical parties (over half  of  the Conservative Party’s f unding
comes f rom f inance).
But investigations post crisis tell only a part of  the story because the constant of  pre- and post-  crisis is
the f inancial oligarchy. The period bef ore the f inancial crisis reveals decades of  spineless ref orms under
Labour and Conservative governments, a continuing closeness between the Treasury, the Bank of
England and the City elite, and the domination of  UKFI and the City of  London as key actors in the
promotion of  light touch regulation. The post-crisis period reveals a marked polit ical reluctance to enact
meaningf ul ref orms and change the structures that devastated the economy.
So the f ault lines in banking run deep and the Tyrie Inquiry will do litt le to address them:  it ’s nearly
business as usual where the regulatory authorit ies decided Libor manipulation merited only a modest f ine
– the penalty is a £290m which equates to just 4.2 per cent of  Barclays pre-tax prof it and is equivalent to
13 days of  prof it. What is required is a public inquiry with a judicial remit, with membership drawn f rom a
broad cross-section of  society with the aim of  addressing a f undamental redef init ion of  the social and
economic roles of  f inance. In short, banks must become public utilit ies with the duty to serve the wider
economy, not players in casinos.
As a start, we need to address some of  the myths pushed by city lobbyists. As CRESC showed in the
‘Alternative report on UK banking ref orm’; f irst, the economic benef its of  the City f or the ‘real’ economy
are an illusion; second, ef f ective PR has allowed the City to govern itself ; and thirdly, much of  the City’s
dealings do litt le to promote welf are or ef f iciency in the wider economy.
Any deep-rooted inquiry into f inance would quickly reach Adair Turner ’s conclusion that much of  banking
is “socially useless”. Successive CRESC reports and working papers, since the Alternative Banking
Report (2009) have accumulated a mass of  empirical evidence which establishes the economic and social
uselessness of  f inance. The f eatures include inf lating assets that led to a f inancial implosion, a sector
creating no net new jobs with employment stable at just one million since the early 1990s, and a
contribution of  less than 8 per cent of  government revenue at its peak – much less than manuf acturing.
If  much of  f inance is not worth saving what kind of  policies should we consider? We can start by splitt ing
retail and investment banks and radically shrinking the latter by f rustrating their high trading volume
business models, which would f ree f unds so that they are channelled into the productive economy. The
UK needs a mixed ecology in banking that would privilege non-PLC type banking models and push
towards towards mutual ownership with regionalisation encouraged in order channel local f unds to local
needs.
The state owned RBS should be converted into industrial banks and the other major banks should set
non-voluntary targets f or productive lending set by government. More broadly, we need to break up the
‘too big to f ail/jail banks’ because the concentrated polit ical power of  the banks enhance their ability to
extract f avourable policies f rom government to the detriment of  other social interest groups. As the
f inancial crash has shown, it places huge burdens on all stakeholders. An imaginative break-up would
ensure break-up along regional lines.
What the past reveals is that the banking crisis is a crisis of  polit ics and the democratic disconnects
which allow f inance to work against the common good. This requires a polit ical f ix that in turn requires
polit ical will. There should be transparency and restrictions around lobbying, the City of  London should
be converted into a public organisation and the f unding of  polit ical parties ref ormed so that they can
prise themselves f ree f rom a small elite of  wealthy backers and start becoming more accountable to
ordinary cit izens.
Notes: CRESC has been working on the ref orm of  the banking sector since 2009 when it published the
‘An Alternative Report on UK banking Ref orm’ and more recently ‘Groundhog Day’ and  ‘Deep Stall?’ which
broadened the research to consider the f ailure to ref orm the f inance sector and also the Eurozone
crisis. This well respected and long established team have recently published a book ‘Af ter the Great 
Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Polit ics of  Ref orm’ which argues that the f inancial crisis was not
an accident, not a disaster, not a catastrophe, nor a f iasco, but a genuine polit ical debacle.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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